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 From commodification to weaponization: the Russian language as ‘pride’ and ‘profit’ 
in Russia’s transnational discourses 
Lara Ryazanova-Clarke  
Abstract 
The article expands the debate about the interaction and conflict of linguistic 
commodification with other values attached to a language. It interrogates Russian 
dominant discourse produced between 2010-2015, focusing on how it attributes the 
values of ‘pride’ and ‘profit’ to the Russian language in three transnational contexts: 
the narrative of ‘compatriots’ outside Russia, the formation of the Eurasian Economic 
Union and the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. It argues that the discursive 
construction of Russian as a means for material advancement is constantly intertwined 
with manufacturing the transnational semantics of belonging to Russia (the 
transnational ‘pride’). This is often overlaid with the instrumental value-attribution for 
Russian for establishing and perpetuating power relations, exerting control and, 
finally, warmongering. 
Key words: linguistic commodification, discourse, Russian, transnational, 
globalization, weaponization 
 
Introduction 
Recent literature on linguistic commodification (Cameron 2000; Heller 2003, 2010; 
2011; Tan and Rubdy 2008; Duchêne 2009; Duchêne and Heller 2012; Heller and 
Duchêne 2012; Pavlenko 2012) has developed a new paradigm for the sociolinguistics 
of globalization. In particular, Duchêne and Heller (2012) have gone a long way 
towards defining the parameters of a commodification theory, based on the premise 
that in the late stage of neo-liberal capitalism, ‘there have been a wide-spread 
emergence of discursive elements that treat language and culture primarily in 
economic terms’ (Heller and Duchêne 2012, 2), in other words, that in certain socio-
political situations language is increasingly configured as a commodity. They frame 
their argument with two contrasting tropes of ‘pride’ and ‘profit’, in which the value 
of language linked to its ability to produce economic and material gain is pitted 
against the ideology of language seen as an instrument of political and cultural value 
assignment.  
Some scholars delving in the ‘pride’ and ‘profit’ distinction stress these are 
mutually constituted and form complex patterns of competition and intertwining, 
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which shape the ways in which social actors, movements and political economies 
mobilize or undermine the differentiating resources for their own ends (e.g. Gal 
2012). Furthermore, exploration of the points of intersection of the ‘pride’ and ‘profit’ 
discourses reveals a whole lot of contradictions and cleavages emerging, in particular, 
from the clashes between the modern and the antiquated, global and local perspectives 
on a language (Heller 2010, 2011; Del Percio and Duchêne 2012; Gal 2012; Heller 
and Bell 2012; Heller and Duchêne 2012). A further unpacking of the interactions and 
contradictions between the two tropes is relevant with regard to situations in which 
the language as a source of symbolic added value may be amenable to patterns that 
could be called imitational commodification in which the language use or knowledge 
has a veneer of economic gain but also fulfils other instrumental purposes and 
objectives. This work therefore aims to expand our understanding of the complex and 
contradictory nature of linguistic commodification and its entanglements with the 
trope of ‘pride’, focusing on the contexts of the globalization of Russian.  
Discussion of these contexts has to take into consideration that, as Sakwa argued, 
in globalization as in other meta-narratives that mediate international interaction, 
Russia ‘by the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century stood at odds with the 
rest of the world’ (2011, 968). Specifically, our account of what speaking Russian 
means in the capitalist condition needs to reflect on the broadly expressed position 
that Russia has advanced and displayed on the global scale a peculiar form of 
‘imitation capitalism’ (Gustafson 1999; Menshikov 2004; Belkovskii 2013; Shevtsova 
2015), combining transnational economic outlook with de-modernising political 
trends. As Robinson stated, Russia presents a ‘political capitalist system’ which is 
‘distinct from the types of capitalism that we know in the global West’ in that it 
‘subordinates profit to political logic routinely’ (Robinson 2012b, 3). 
To explore how Russia’s globalization ‘oddity’ relates to the discourses on 
language, this article relocates the discussion of the entwining tropes of ‘pride’ and 
‘profit’ to the heart of Russia’s hegemonic discursive formation -- a space in which 
the construction of the dominant vision of globalization takes place. The study aims to 
analyze how the theme of the Russian language emerges in the dominant Russian 
narratives of transnational and regional integration, how the language is attributed 
meanings corresponding with ‘pride’, ‘profit’ and indeed other instrumental values, 
and where the points of intersection of these values are.  
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The work draws on the Bourdieusian notion of symbolic value of a linguistic 
resource which can be transferred into instrumental and material values (Bouridieu 
1991), and applies a broadly defined critical discourse studies approach (Blommaert 
2005; Fairclough 1989, 1995; Wodak and Meyer 2001; Wodak and Chilton 2005; 
Wodak at al. 2009; Wodak 2013), in particular, work on the strategies of discursive 
meaning construction and subject categorization (van Leeuwen 1996, 2008; Wodak at 
al. 2009). The meaning construction and value attribution in relation to the Russian 
language is examined in three transnational contexts that emerged between 2010 and 
2015 – the treatment of ‘compatriots’ outside Russia, the formation of the Eurasian 
Economic Union and the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. It will be 
demonstrated that the discursive construction of value of the Russian language as a 
means for material advancement in the Russian transnational situations (‘profit’) is 
constantly intertwined with manufacturing the transnational semantics of belonging to 
Russia (what is termed here the transnational ‘pride’). This is often overlaid with the 
instrumental value-attribution for Russian for establishing and perpetuating power 
relations, exerting control and, finally, warmongering. The findings allow us to 
propose that the ‘profit’ trope in certain cases has an imitational variant, linked to the 
transmutations of values. My data are derived from the legal, governmental and media 
fields and contain texts of documents, discursive practices of the state officials, 
including President Putin and members of the State Duma, and the pro-Kremlin media 
outlets.  
 
A transnational tint of the Russian language hegemonic ‘pride’  
From the tsars to Putin’s era the conventional discourse of ‘pride’, framed by the 
Herderian idea that language is bound to culture and territory, has been insufficient 
and incomplete in relation to Russian. With a long history of an imperial language, 
Russian has never been, strictly speaking, the language of an ethnic Russian nation-
state and its employment in the construction of an ethno-national identity has been 
relatively weak.  
There are two major facets to this legacy. The first one relates to the role of 
Russian in identity construction in the independent Russian state. After the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, contradiction between the imperial and the national became one of 
the key tensions inherited by the Russian Federation from the Soviet institutionalized 
multinational and multilingual configuration (Brubacker 1996; Suny 2012, 17). While 
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the majority of non-Russian post-Soviet states have leaped to the post-multinational 
regime (Brubacker 2011) and embarked on vigorous nationalizing language policies 
favoring ‘one nation -- one language’ ideology, Russia continued replicating the 
Soviet-type multilingual rhetoric. As a demand grew in Russia for developing a 
coherent unifying national identity, especially pronounced under Putin’s rule, the 
multilingual rhetoric began to contradict the increasing attempts to use the Russian 
language as a core ‘pride’ concept in the national identity discourse (Ryazanova-
Clarke 2006).  
The trend for constructing a national ‘pride’ discourse around the Russian 
language is additionally disrupted by the second facet of the imperial legacy, namely 
that historically Russian was imbued with a strong symbolic value of a ‘transnational 
connector’. The language was integral to the centripetal force of recurring rounds of 
‘mini-globalization’ whereby the ‘historic empire formation [was] involved in 
unification of the previously sequestered territories’ (Robertson 1990, 21). In the 
imperial, Soviet and post-Soviet epochs, Russian was that legitimate language which 
was called upon to structure the ideology of integration and coherence. In the Soviet 
period, this discourse valorized Russian as an inter-ethnic connector linking together 
disparate communities in and between the ‘brotherly’ Soviet republics and as a 
language which brought education, culture and technological advancement to the 
national peripheries (Mikhalchenko and Trushkova 2003). Moreover, for valorization 
of this kind it was not enough for Russian to be attributed qualities of an instrumental 
and utilitarian lingua franca, demands were also made on empathetic attachment and 
emotional loyalty towards the transnational connotations of the language able to 
provide unity, cohesion and cultural elevation of the ‘minor brothers’ (Suny 2012; 
Ryazanova-Clarke 2014b). This meant that the linguistic value of a ‘transnational 
connector’ have become linked to a specific ‘pride’ trope standing for Russia’s 
ambition and an assumed right for ‘holding together’ and control of the neighboring 
territories -- a transnational ‘pride’. 
After the end of the Soviet Union, Russian was losing circulation in the majority 
of the new independent states and the transnational ‘pride’ attribute of Russian was 
demoted in value and status (Pavlenko 2008; Brubaker 2011). It was indeed the 
economic trigger which brought about the revitalization of the transnational meanings 
of Russian in the post-Soviet states. Russia’s emergence, from mid 2000s, as a 
globally reckoned economic power was crucial for a new stage in the globalization of 
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Russian and for the destabilization of the local discourses of ‘pride’, associated with 
‘one nation – one language’ ideology. Since then the language experienced a 
comeback as a resource for promoting and delivering products and services to the 
increasingly important and regionally dominant Russian speaking customer and 
investor (Pavlenko 2012; Ryazanova-Clarke 2014a; Berezkina this issue; Muth this 
issue). Illustrative of this process is a testimony by Armen Smbatian, the former 
ambassador of Armenia in Russia (Example 1): 
 
(1) Even when we had the USSR, a friend of mine from Lithuania kept on saying: 
‘Russians are the occupiers!’ But recently I met him. He has a business and 
apparently lots of friends in Russia. I told him: ‘Listen, you have been telling me all 
these tales about the occupiers!’ To which he says calmly: ‘It was then that they were 
occupiers and now they are clients.’ (Izvestiia, December 25, 2012) 
 
At the same time, the transnational semantic fields defining Russian have been 
affected by the ‘pride’ overtones that have been on the rise internally. The hegemonic 
narrative was assuming a ‘patriotic’ flavor especially after Putin became president for 
the third time in 2012 (Dausé et al. 2015). It is now increasingly articulated by the 
ideologies of Russian nationalism and neo-imperialist revisionism which were 
encouraged to move mainstream out of the marginalized enclaves.1 According to the 
ex-employee of the Institute for Strategic Studies Aleksandr Sytin, the new ideology 
was concocted from the elements of monarchism, Stalinism, Orthodoxy, xenophobia, 
and hatred towards the West (Volchek 2015). This, in effect, neo-imperial messianic 
doctrine speaks of the ‘civilisational community’ of Russkii Mir (The Russian World) 
and aims at creating new meta-narratives that legitimize Russia’s hegemony over the 
‘Russian-speaking world’ beyond the Russian Federation by the claims of linguistic, 
‘spiritual’ (dukhovnyi) and cultural unity (Shekhovtsov 2008, 2009; Bassin 2012; 
Umland 2012, 2013; Menkiszak 2014; Wawrzonek 2014; Laruelle 2015; Sooner 
2015). The role of the Russian language in this ideology is crucial – it assumes the 
position of ‘pride’ but rather than linking it to the local level of cultural authenticity 
(Heller 2011; Heller and Duchene 2012), modifies it into a symbol of transnational 
connection to Russia, as seen in Example 2. The Example is an excerpt from an 
interview with Armen Airapetian, a member of the elite Izborsk Club and a lecturer at 
the Volga Region Management School. Evoking Russian imperial past Airapetian 
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uses the conquering flag metaphor to refer to the Russian language. In the ideology he 
embraces the ‘pride’ of the Russian language that stretches to other lands -- the ‘pride’ 
which is to be enforced: 
 
(2) The Russian Emperor Nikolas I, once said: ‘Where the Russian flag is raised, 
it will never be lowered.’ After many years of my academic research I have come 
to the conclusion that today this flag is the Russian language.2 (Izborskii klub 
2014) 
 
Thus, the combination of, on the one hand, linguistic globalization with, on the other, 
nationalist and neo-imperial ideology at home called upon a specific kind of 
discourses to construct the meanings of Russian for Russian hegemony. Even when 
the Russian language is relied upon as a ‘pride’ symbol of the internal nation-
building, it has also been made available for the production of the transnational 
meanings connected to the historical rounds of ‘mini-globalisation’. The rest of the 
article will explore the current discursive entanglements of the transnational ‘pride’ 
with the instrumental meanings attributed to Russian including those of the profitable 
economic advantage.  
 
Patterns of discursive entwines 
The Compatriot discourse 
Since approximately mid 2000s, the Russian state began vigorously to employ the 
Russian language at the international level instrumentally, attributing to it the 
meaning of a soft power resource. In this role, Russian was invested with the power to 
deliver influence to the outside world, or as Nye put it, to ‘co-opt rather than coerce’ 
and to ‘shape the preferences of others’ (Nye 2009, 22; Saari 2014). 
In order to co-opt Russian speakers who live outside the Russian Federation a 
number of institutions were set up by the Kremlin. Among those the Federal Agency 
for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and 
International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo) was established in 
2008.3 The category of ‘compatriots’ (sootechestvenniki) was constructed to include 
the Russian language speakers who reside outside Russia but who regardless of their 
passport nationality were deemed to belong to the realm controlled by the Russian 
state (‘The Russian World’) (Ryazanova-Clarke 2014b). Such categorization 
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espoused transnational ‘pride’ and was legitimized in The Law on the State Policy 
Towards Compatriots, whose multiple amendments show how the meanings attributed 
to the Russian language were reified in their relation to the compatriots. Originally the 
Law was adopted in 1999 to legislate for an option to return for those Russians who 
after the break up of the USSR had remained in former Soviet republics and who 
preferred at some stage to migrate to the Russian Federation. Since then, the Law was 
amended five times, including the more relatively recent July 2010 and July 2013 
versions. The first definition of the compatriot was civic and inclusive, encompassing 
those who ever had citizenship of the USSR regardless of their current residence and 
nationality (O gosudarstvennoi politike 1999, Art. 1 para 2). By the second decade of 
the millennium, the post-Soviet states had drifted cardinally apart and the above 
categorization was changed. Instead of the civic criterion of a former citizenship, the 
redactions that followed conjured up the essentializing measurements of 
‘compatriotism’ which listed the Russian language together with ethnicity, territory 
and culture to circumscribe the semantic field of belonging. The Russian language 
was now a key indicator of the compatriot and was linked not to all Soviet 
descendents but to those people who themselves, or whose ancestors or blood 
relatives had lived or have descended from the Russian territories and who claim to 
belong to the ethnic groups ‘who have historically lived in Russia’ (O 
gosudatstvennoi politike 2010, Art. 1, paras 2 and 3). Also, in the 2010 and 2013 
amendments of the Law, semantic fields of affect and agency were added to the 
transnational ‘pride’ meaning construction. Similar to the Soviet practices described 
earlier, the subjects were expected not simply to be competent in Russian but to have 
an emotional contact with it – that is, to be active promoters and advocates of the 
language. Thus, the redaction of 2010 requires that self-identification as a Russian 
compatriot is to be ‘supported by the civic or professional activity to preserve the 
Russian language… [and] Russian culture abroad.’ In addition, the Law expects that 
compatriots engage in public diplomacy in support of Russia in the country of their 
residence (ibid., Art. 3, para 2). 
The language, culture, ethnicity and land that evoke emotions are placed in the 
centre of the new discourse of transnational ‘pride’ around compatriots. In this 
discourse Russian speakers are constructed as a contemporary, globally sprawling  
virtual expanded ‘nation’ bound up with the eighteenth century Herderian sense that 
they command the language which reflects Volksgeist -- the spirit of this nation. 
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However the compatriot transnational ‘pride’ value seems to be mercurial as it is 
appropriated by an instrumental use by which loyalty to Russian language and culture 
is translated into the loyalty to the Russian state and is inscribed in the Law. Thus 
through the use of the ‘pride’ trope and its ‘soft’ linguistic and cultural imperatives -- 
the compatriot is transformed into a ‘patriot’. The symbolic ‘profit’ of the activation 
of these semantic fields attributed to speaking Russian is that the law ultimately 
recruits the uncritical advocates of the Russian state, while the language and the 
sentiments of its users are used an instrument enabling the Russian state to breed 
numbers of its promoters and defenders in the country of their residence. Тhe Head of 
Rossorudnichestvo Konstantin Kosachev spoke with an enviable frankness about the 
true objectives of compatriot cultivation in which his organization engages. 
Presenting the Rossotrudnichestvo’s New Generation Program at the Duma he 
stressed that the visits to Russia they organize for the targeted groups are completely 
politically expedient: ‘Naturally the purpose of these trips is not the visit itself, and 
even less so tourism, the participants should form an activist group of Russia’s 
sympathizers’ (Duma 10 April 2013). 
Furthermore, those who can demonstrate their ability to comply with the 
requirements placed on them by the discourse of transnational ‘pride’ and, 
consequently, qualify for being a compatriot, may in turn commodify their linguistic 
allegiance alongside with their other loyalties. The Russian State Program for the 
Resettling of Compatriots (2013-2020) offers for those Russian speakers who wish to 
return to the land of their heritage 7,321 rubles for travel and 60,782 rubles for other 
resettlement costs, and provides them with a mortgage on a house or land purchase 
along with other benefits including university student scholarships. Naturally, apart 
from producing new obedient Russian-speaking citizens, the Compatriots program has 
another objective, that is, to address Russia’s growing demographic problem. The 
target is currently for 300,000 compatriots to be returned annually and to be settled in 
Russian sparsely populated territories, primarily in and around the Siberian 
Novosibirsk region known for its hostile climate and poor infrastructure 
(Gosudarstvennaia Programma ‘Sootechestvenniki’ 2013-2020; Obrashchenie 2012). 
So, the official compatriot discourse combines the profit that one could expect from 
fluency in Russian with the pride linked to the demonstration of loyalty to the 
language, culture and the state. This is overlaid by the instrumental meanings equally 
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attached to Russian as it features as a vehicle of producing Russia’s supporters abroad 
and the controlled inward migration and re-population of Siberian areas. 
 
The Eurasian Union discourse 
Russian economic success achieved in the second half of the 2000s blew into the sails 
of Russian regional integrational ideology. In about 25 years of post-Soviet existence, 
Russia led numerous attempts at re-integration of the former Soviet space in various 
configurations. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) formed at the 
deathbed of the Soviet Union has never grown into a full-blooded functioning 
institution. Consequently, creating alternative viable fora for what Libman and 
Vinokurov call ‘holding-together regionalism’ (2012, 2) became a key issue of Putin’s 
doctrine (Hoffmann 2012: 2). After an array of partially overlapping organizations 
were formed and ‘remained fragmented and incomplete’ (Oksanian 2012), more 
determination was demonstrated by the emergence of the Customs Union in 2010, 
amalgamating Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Having removed barriers to the 
movement of trade, capital and labor (Hartwell 2013), this evolved from January 2015 
into the Eurasian Economic Union, envisaging in future a full economic integration, a 
currency union and nurturing broader ambitions beyond the economic agenda 
(Libman and Vinokurov 2012, 3). On 2 January 2015 the Eurasian Union was joined 
by Armenia while currently Kyrgyzstan is set to follow suit.  
The Russian language acknowledged as the new Union’s lingua franca was 
conceived as central to the Eurasian Union project. This has been interpreted by some 
observers as part of the asymmetries of power relations between the Union member 
states, together with other Moscow-favoring political arrangements, such as the plans 
for the headquarters of the Union Commission to be based in Moscow and for the 
ruble be the common currency (Popescu 2014: 16). Despite the fact that Russian is an 
official language in both Kazakhstan and Belarus these countries have responded to 
Russia’s linguistic promotion as evidence of being placed in the subordinate role and 
have consequently been expressly cautious of further expansion of integration 
(Dutkiewicz 2015, 8). Thus, the value of Russian in the Eurasian discourse is 
intensively negotiated and seen as a symbol of unity, a facilitator of prosperity and an 
index of unequal power distribution. Interpreting Russian as undoubtedly a ‘profit’ 
indicator, a leading specialist in the Eurasian integration economics Evgeny 
Vinokurov argues that its use in the integrative process is an unchallengeable, top 
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quality commodity which translates into an overall benevolent integrative impact on 
the Union’s operations: ‘the Russian language plays a huge role as a means of 
integration. Research shows that the use of a common language has a positive effect 
on the intensity of trade and investment relationships’ (2013, 21). Elsewhere this 
value is illustrated with statistics measuring the use of Russian in the percentage of 
productivity increase: it is claimed that those countries that have a common language 
enjoy a 50-60% higher trade level than those that do not (Libman and Vinokurov 
2012, 117).  
Similarly, Russian official discourse customarily attributes a pivotal ‘profit’ 
meaning to the use of Russian within the Eurasian Union. The value of Russian as the 
prime resource of the Union was indicated by declaring it a factor of 
‘communicational integration’ (Mikheeva 2014), ‘the language of the ruble’ (tipped to 
be the Union’s common currency) (Matvienko 2012), while the Union itself was 
increasingly called the ‘Russian linguo-cultural space’ (Kobzar’ 2013). Putin speaking 
at the Russia’s People’s Front Forum in December 2013 and putting Russian in the 
centre of the Eurasian universe said that among ‘the very many advantages’ of the 
Eurasian Union over other integration projects, ‘the first and most important is the 
language of international communication, Russian’ (Putin 2013). The argumentation 
topos of economic co-operation ‘benefit’ in this and other texts legitimizes the 
centrality of Russian, constructing it as a transnational facilitator of economic 
prosperity for all member states. However as the Example (3) from the 2012 Agreed 
Statement issued by the State Duma illustrates, what looks on the surface as the 
discourse of ‘profit’ reveals the signs of appropriation by the transnational ‘pride’ 
semantics.  
 
(3) Государственная Дума считает, что русский язык должен стать 
надежной цементирующей основой будущего Евразийского 
экономического союза и призывает предпринять все возможные усилия, 
направленные на качественный рост российского культурного присутствия 
за пределами Российской Федерации. (Zaiavlenie 2012) 
[The State Duma considers that the Russian language must become a reliant 
cementing basis of the future Eurasian Economic Union and calls to undertake all 
possible efforts directed at a qualitative growth of Russian cultural presence 
outside the Russian Federation.]  
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The statement might well give an impression that Russian is attributed in it a role of 
an economic commodity however the Duma’s discursive means of articulation arrive 
from a different semantic field. The text is structured by the ‘language is cement’ 
metaphor and by the imperative mood (должен [must]) that together suggest an 
imposition of the centrality and fixity of Russian which is expected to bind the states 
in the future Union. The agency is also significant: the Russian language and culture 
are construed as some static substance which is qualified by nominalization as having 
‘presence’ in the states in question (присутствие [presence]). In order to achieve the 
‘cementing’ capacity, the language whose current presence is judged by the Duma as 
insufficient, needs to undergo a transformation foisted on it by some unnamed agents 
whose activity (depicted by the verbal phrase предпринять усилия [undertake 
efforts]) would vigorously propel a substantive (качественный [qualitative]) growth 
of the language. The high level of intensity of these agents’ efforts is highlighted 
through exaggeration (‘all possible efforts’).  
Thus the Duma excerpt (3) does not seem to take for granted the commodity 
value for the member-states of the Russian language -- this explains the calls for it to 
be intensely propped up by invasive actions and resources, pointing rather to the 
transnational ‘pride’ meaning attribution. Within this interpretation, the term 
‘presence’ may be seen as a military euphemism reminiscent of the phrase военное 
присутствие [military presence]. The phrase is habitually used in Russian to 
describe the deployment of troops in a foreign territory. Usually, приутствие in the 
military meaning forms collocates with the cognates of рост [growth] and сила 
[power, strength] (наращивать/ усиливать [to increase/ strengthen]), both of which 
occurring in the Duma text.4 Overall, the commodification of Russian in the Eurasian 
Economic Union turns out to be more about imposition of Russian upon the member 
states and the instrumental use of the language for re-establishing hierarchies in the 
post-Soviet space. This demonstrates that the ‘profit’ trope in relation to Russian as 
the language of economic prosperity in the Eurasian Union is heavily entangled with a 
linguistic ideology that normalizes the dominance of Russian in the post-Soviet space. 
The unequivocal statement of the ideology of Russian as an instrument for 
empire building was voiced in the Duma debates of 16 May 2014 by Mikhail 
Degtiarev (LDPR). He used the common trope of the Russian language as a 
transnational connector, but employed the topos of the temporal erasure thereby 
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equating the Eurasian Union with the Soviet Union and the Russian empire (Example 
4).  
 
(4) Русский язык столетиями — это очевидно — способствовал укреплению 
межнациональных связей народов в едином многонациональном 
Российском государстве, которое называлось по-разному: и Российская 
Империя, и Советский Союз, сегодня — Евразийский союз. (Duma 16 May 
2014) 
[It is obvious that the Russian language for centuries has facilitated the 
strengthening of the international links between the nations in one multinational 
Russian state that had different names: Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and 
today – the Eurasian Union.]  
 
Example (4) demonstrates that transnational ‘pride’ overtones of Russian speaking 
while heightening its integrational meaning at the same time constructs and 
normalizes the neo-imperial instrumentality attached to it.  
 
From commodification to weaponization 
Linguistic seduction of Ukraine 
In the Russian dominant discourse the events in Ukraine -- the Maidan anti-corruption 
revolution, the ensuing Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the proxy war in the 
South-Eastern Ukrainian regions (2014 - to date) were framed by the linguistic 
narrative. At the earlier stages of the crisis we encounter the discourse of ‘profit’ in 
which the linguistic argument was linked to the advantages for Ukraine of joining the 
Eurasian Union rather than signing the Association agreement with the European 
Union. Ukraine mattered for Russia’s ‘holding together’ regionalism so much that 
arguably ‘[t]he Eurasian Economic Union was to a large degree conceived and 
designed to attract Ukraine’ (Popescu 2014, 27). Ukraine mattered for the developing 
Eurasian Union for many economic reasons: having an established close trade with 
Poland, it was wanted as a bridge between the Union and the Western countries. More 
than that, Ukraine mattered symbolically as one of the three Slavic nations ‘destined’ 
to be linked together (Hartwell 2013), but  even more so, it mattered as Putin’s 
personal obsession, a mirror to his political failures and humiliations, which he had to 
get under control.  
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In the pre-Maidan period, the Russian elite discourse spelled out the advantages 
for Ukraine to join the Eurasian Union through the ‘profit’ trope which was mixed 
with the transnational ‘pride’ narrative built on the argument of closeness of origin, 
language and culture between Russia and Ukraine. The Russian language was 
similarly portrayed through the semantics of closeness to Ukrainian, as for example, 
in an excerpt (5) from Putin’s September 2013 speech in which he importuned 
Ukraine to reject the partnership agreement with the EU and to join instead the 
Eurasian Union. Arguing for the economic benefits of such a move, Putin portrays the 
Russian language through the semantics of similarity with Ukrainian and uses the 
linguistic and cultural reasons for construction of commonality:  
 
(5) Киевская Русь началась как основа будущего огромного Российского 
государства. У нас общая традиция, общая ментальность, общая история, 
общая культура. У нас очень близкие языки. В этом смысле, я ещё раз хочу 
повторить, мы один народ… Это часть нашего большого российского мира, 
российско-украинского.  (Valdai Forum, 19 September 2013) 
[Kievan Rus originated as a foundation of the future huge Russian state. We have 
a common tradition, common mentality, common history and common culture. 
Our languages are similar, and in this respect I would like to reiterate that we 
are one people… This is part of our large Russian world, the Russian-Ukrainian 
world.]  
 
Here, Putin uses the transnational ‘pride’ trope to erase the differences between 
Russia and Ukraine and construct the category of ‘one people’ (один народ). This 
strategy works together with other tools such as employing the topos ‘history justifies 
present actions and judgements’ when he evokes the memory of the Medieval Kievan 
Rus as a common space, and using synonymously the notions of the ‘Russio-
Ukrainian world’, the ‘huge Russian state’, and the ‘Russian world’.  
The purpose of Putin’s transnational ‘pride’ discourse is instrumental -- to legitimize 
what he sees as the inevitability for Ukraine to be together with Russia. This argument 
is also supported by a generous cash offer to the economically struggling neighbor: 
Putin’s tropes of commonality are followed by an announcement that in case Ukraine 
chooses the path of the Eurasian Union it would receive $9 bn from Russia in the 
form of energy price reductions. The linguistic similarity as the ‘pride’ token may 
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thus be exchanged for Russia’s treatment of Ukraine as a privileged business partner, 
in other words, language and culture may be considered as a factor of ‘profit’. The 
‘profit’ itself is rather imitative as it is appropriated by an instrumental objective to 
make Ukraine compliant to the Russian will. It works in addition to the linguistic and 
cultural argument of closeness which allows Putin to discursively subsume Ukraine 
into the category of the ‘Russian world’, in other words, to symbolically take it under 
Russian control.  
 
Linguistic weaponization as inverse transnational ‘pride’ 
The Ukranian conflict has revealed that advancing a revisionist agenda, Russia aims 
to redraft the post-Second world war world order and has proposed to the world its 
own variant of globalization, in which Russia is restored to the status of a major world 
power with its own spheres of influence, civilizational differentiation and messianic 
engagement with its neighbors. For this vision, Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss 
have suggested the term ‘malevolent globalization’ (2014, 43). They explain that the 
key feature of malevolent globalization is the reconsideration of the soft power 
approach to the outside world and weaponization of its major tools, namely 
information, culture and money. Pomerantev and Weiss’s subtle analysis of Russia’s 
contemporary international behavior however overlooks language as a crucial Russian 
weaponization mechanism, which the section below attempts to remedy, looking at 
weaponization within the ‘pride’ and ‘profit’ paradigm.  
Efforts to convert linguistic elements into tools of conquest have been made from 
time immemorial and currently there is a growing research interest in the subject (for 
e.g. Matsuda et al. 1995; Lecercle and Riley 2005; Pratt 2009; Rafael 2012). However 
the ways how the discourses about language are engaged in this process have not been 
sufficiently discussed. Using Pomerantsev and Weiss’ understanding of malevolent 
globalization, the rest of the section taps into this debate and explores the role of the 
elite discourse on the Russian language as a facilitator of weaponization. It focuses on 
how during the Russo-Ukrainian crisis the meanings of ‘pride’ and ‘profit’ attached to 
Russian have been converted from the means of soft power to weapons of 
warmongering. 
Discursive evidence shows that after Ukrainian President Viktor Ianukovich had 
abruptly relinquished, in November 2013, the signing of the Association Agreement 
with the EU and Ukraine erupted with the pro-European revolution, the semantics 
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attached to the Russian language began to change. Just as before it represented 
Russian as a vehicle for Ukraine to improve its economy and receive Russian cash 
bonuses, now the narrative of Russian began to be employed to build solidarity with 
one part of the Ukrainian society and against the other, and to justify and legitimize 
Russia’s aggressive behavior towards its neighbor.  
Mary Pratt notes that linguistic weaponization is a way of constructing an enemy: 
‘War by its adversarial logic produces multilingual scenarios; linguistic difference 
marks others, and others easily become enemies’ (Pratt 2009, 1525). So, value began 
to be attributed not to the closeness of the two brotherly, almost indistinguishable, 
languages undergirding ‘one nation’, but singularly to Ukrainian Russian speakers 
depicted to be in need of protection from the ‘aggressive’ Ukrainian language, which 
is about to take over Russian, and from the fierce and threatening Ukrainian-speaking 
‘fascists’ – the term which the Russian propaganda adopted for Ukrainophones 
(Ryazanova-Clarke 2014; Gaufman 2015; Platt 2015). 
Dominant Russian discourses shaped the weaponization campaign by widely 
employing the dismantling strategies in relation to the two languages. For example, 
the strategy of differentiation which constructed and reinforced a boundary and a 
sense of alienation between the Ukrainian and Russian languages became the staple of 
Russia’s spiraling war machine. This tool may be seen in the Example (6):  
 
(6) Именно поэтому восстал украинский Юго-Восток, не желающий 
говорить на чужом языке. (Izvestiia, April 11, 2014) 
[It is because of this that the Ukrainian South-East has rebelled, who did not want 
to speak an alien language]  
 
The excerpt (6) from the Kremlin controlled Izvestiia newspaper demonstrates how, in 
order to legitimize Russian aggression, the Ukrainian language which earlier had been 
ascribed the ‘pride’ value of being a part of Russian civilizational belonging, has been 
described as an alien, foreign and dissimilar to Russian. The dismantling strategy is 
compounded of the polarization and dychotomization of Russian and Ukrainian 
represented as two languages separated by a clear, impenetrable boundary into ‘us’ 
and ‘the aliens’. This portrayal suppresses the knowledge that apart from Russian-
Ukrainian mutual comprehensibility, the large proportion of people in Ukraine use 
dialects and mixtures such as the wide-spread Russian-Ukrainian surzhyk (Bilaniuk 
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1997, 2004, 2005; Flier 2000; Kulyk 2010), which also is fluid and varied (Bilaniuk 
2004). Weaponized Russian is no longer depicted to be a transnational unifier of 
multilingual groups, it rather assists in forming allegiances to new illusionary 
categories, first of all, that of the ‘threatened monolingual speakers of standard 
Russian abroad fighting for their linguistic rights’. 
The discursive portrayal of the ‘world’ has also changed from the ‘Russo-
Ukrainain world’ of Putin’s 2013 speech. The post-Maidan ‘world’ becomes 
unhyphenatedly Russian for, despite their varied ethnic and civic identities, Russian 
speakers in Crimea and the East of Ukraine are categorized as belonging to the nation 
of the ‘Russian world’ torn apart. Menkiszak observes that indeed, evolvement of 
Russia’s policy towards Ukraine was a catalyst for the reification of the Kremlin-born 
‘Russian world’ doctrine, so Russia’s assumed role of a defender of Russian speaking 
communities in the post-Soviet states encouraged the doctrine to formulate ‘more 
openly and in more radical terms’ (2014: 1) its conceptual framework for Russian 
dominance in the post-Soviet area.  
In a speech delivered on the day of the signing an Agreement on the Admission 
of Crimea into the Russian Federation on 18 April 2014, Putin used the trope of the 
‘separated Russian people’ for the first time stating that ‘Russian people became one 
of the largest, if not to say the largest, separated nation in the world’ (Putin 2014b).5 
Many observers have noted that this is reminiscent of the doctrine used by Adolf 
Hitler and his Nazi ideologist Alfred Rosenberg on the annexation of Sudetenland in 
1938; while a similar rhetoric of a ‘divided Serbian nation’ was employed by the war 
crimes perpetrator Slobodan Milošević (Illarionov 2014).  
In this rhetoric, the integrational transnational qualities of Russian are still 
asserted to unite the Russian-speaking ‘world’ but are reconfigured, rebranded and 
realigned along the new lines of attraction and repulsion. Russian is now a tool which 
assists ‘collecting Russian lands’ with Putin as the chief agent who has brought the 
speakers of Russian into the fold of their lost metropolis.  
In another discursive event – a press-conference given during the build up to the 
conflict on 4 March 2014 (Example 7), Putin inverts the ‘pride’ trope to present the 
argument of the ‘protection’ of Russian speakers to justify Russian military advance 
in Eastern Ukraine:  
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(7) Putin: И вот когда мы это видим, мы тогда понимаем, что беспокоит 
граждан Украины – и русских, и украинцев, вообще русскоязычное 
население, проживающее в восточных и в южных регионах Украины. Их 
беспокоит вот такой беспредел. И если мы увидим, что этот беспредел 
начинается в восточных регионах, если люди попросят нас о помощи […], то 
мы оставляем за собой право использовать все имеющиеся у нас средства 
для защиты этих граждан.  
[Putin: When we see this we understand what worries citizens of Ukraine – 
Russians, Ukrainians and generally Russian-speakers inhabiting East and South 
of Ukraine. This lawlessness worries them. And if we notice that this lawlessness 
starts in the Eastern regions and if people ask us for help, then we leave for 
ourselves the right to use any means that we have to protect these citizens.] (Putin, 
2014a) 
 
Suppressing their ethnicity and citizenship, Putin identifies Ukrainian Russian 
speakers as a homogenous group through their linguistic characteristic (‘generally 
Russian-speakers’) and regards this characteristic as an entitlement for Russia to take 
action to protect them ‘with all means available’. Henceforth such inverse 
transnational ‘pride’ discourse calling for revenge against those prosecuting Russian-
speaking in Ukraine has been commonly used in Russian dominant narrative. A 
similar ‘pride’ trope is employed in the Duma contributions as illustrated in Example 
(8): stories told by the deputies emphasize the alleged violence perpetrated against 
Russian speakers while the latter are depicted as passive victims. Weaponization is 
further supported by regularly evoking the emotive semantic fields related to the 
Second World War and Nazi Germany to constitute the Ukrainian events and 
legitimize a military protective invasion against atrocities that Russian speech is 
allegedly subjected to:  
 
(8) V. Zhirinovskii: вот дать равные права [русским]… не хотят: идёт не 
просто зажим культуры, газет, радио, школ — сегодня избивают русских за 
то, что они говорят по-русски! (Шум в зале.) В Киеве или в Одессе, если 
правые радикалы выходят на улицу и слышат русскую речь, они этих 
русскоговорящих людей подвергают физическому насилию — такого не 
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было ни в одной стране мира, даже в фашистской Германии! (Duma  4 
April 2014) 
[see, they do not want to give equal rights to Russians. They do not just 
discriminate against [Russian] culture, press, radio, schools – today they beat up 
Russians for speaking Russian! (Agitation in the audience) In Kiev or Odessa, 
when the right-wing radicals get out in the streets and hear Russian speech they 
subject these Russian speakers to physical violence – this has never happened in 
any country of the world, not even in Nazi Germany!] 
 
Thus, the purpose of weaponization affords extra instrumental values to be attached to 
the language and renders other values imitational. In the case of the Ukrainian conflict 
it inverted the transnational meanings of Russian. The trope of transnational ‘pride’ 
associated with commonality and, linked to it, ‘profit’ that had precipitated the war 
have disappeared from the discursive sight, giving out its imitational nature and 
yielding to the inverse, divisive transnational trope of ‘pride’ that annunciating 
outright violence and aggression. Moreover, as Pratt confirms, ‘war weaponizes the 
capacity of lying to produce injury, and deception for this purpose is sanctioned and 
indeed valued’ (2009: 1524). So, as the rules of war dictate, stories of linguistic 
threats and persecutions of speakers that stand behind the weaponization of Russian, 
are based on a fantasy, or plainly speaking, on a lie instrumental for production of the 
inverse ‘pride’ values suitable for the new contexts.  
 
Conclusion 
Sakwa notes that ‘“the international” in Russian thinking has been both constitutive of 
its civilizational identity while at the same time the source of systemic conflict’ (2011, 
958). Patterns of meaning attribution to Russian with regard to its transnational 
‘pride’ and ‘profit’ show a profound aptness of this observation. From deeply 
ingrained, centuries-long Russian discourses, the narrative of civilizational Russian 
endeavor stretching far beyond Russia’s geographical borders has re-emerged, 
engendering a very specific transnational ‘pride’ trope and, in the recent years, has 
formed a conflicting symbiosis with the ‘profit’ trope originated from Russia’s 
exposure to economic globalization. As the globalized incarnation of the Russian 
economy departs from the neo-liberal capitalist models and privileges political 
solutions, this impacts on the nature of the relations between discursive tropes of 
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‘pride’ and ‘profit’ associated with the Russian language. Dominant discourses of the 
Russian language in the three transnational contexts – the narratives of compatriots, of 
the Eurasian Union and the Ukrainian crisis -- demonstrate that ‘pride’ and ‘profit’ 
may become indistinguishable and appear in a number of transmutations, guises and 
imitations. Not least of those is the case of weaponization of Russian, the narrative in 
which the language comes clothed in an inverse transnational ‘pride’. As Pomerantsev 
(2014) put it, the Russian world is the one in which ‘nothing is true and everything is 
possible’. It is a world in which imitational ‘profit’ reveals a hindside of the hastily 
manufactured ‘pride’ while commodification yields weaponization.  
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